198,231 East Asian languages, 163 Edit Alias dialog box, 56 ENABLE command, 147 Encrypting File System (EFS), 234-239 Cipher utility, 239 DRA to recover encrypted files, 236-238 on stand—alone computer, 237 exam essentials, 239 managing file sharing, 235-236 error log, for troubleshooting installation, 29 error. Installing fast asian languages lf you regularly receive or prepare work in Chinese, Japanese or Korean characters, you may wish to install East Asian languages. 5 Check the box beside lnstall files for East Asian languages and click OK. 6 lf you are prompted to insert the Windows CD, do so now. Installing East Asian.

When you try to install files for East Asian languages, you are asked for a Windows XP installation disk. These days, Windows comes pre-installed, so few people have a real Windows XP disk. Here’s how to install without the DVD/CD-ROM. Only Happens on Earlier Versions of Windows XP I bought two Thinkpad laptops with Windows XP in 2002 and 2007. The 2002 (no service pack, I think) exhibits this problem; the 2007 model (Service Pack 2) does not. So some time between 2002 and 2007, this ceased being an issue. Installation Procedure The key is that the East Asian language installation files are on your hard drive, not some separate DVD or CD-ROM.

Here is how to install East Asian languages on English Windows XP: • In the Control Panel, go to Date, Time, Language, and Regional Settings • Select Add other languages. The Regional and Language Options form will appear. Select the Languages tab.

• Check Install files for East Asian Languages. Dismiss the Install Supplemental Language Support dialog that warns you of how this will consume lots of disk space. • Click OK in the Regional and Language Options form.

• You will be asked to specify a location for the files. The file browser will ask you to insert your Windows XP installation disk, and propose a file path on your DVD/CD-ROM drive like D:I386.

But you don’t have a CD-ROM. • Instead, you need to specify the folder that contain file cplexe.exe: • It could be anywhere, but first try the usual suspects: • C:I386 • C:I386lang • C:WINDOWSI386 • C:WINDOWSServicePackFilesi386lang • Try searching your entire hard disk for cplexe.exe • If all else fails, search the Internet for cplexe.exe and download it. Past readers have seen good results with the. Wherever you get them, make sure to scan the files with an up-to-date virus scanning program. • Now back to the Regional and Language Options form. Specify the folder containing cplexe.exe as the DVD/CD-ROM drive (instead of D:I386).

• Reboot • Return to the Languages tab of the Regional and Language Options form • Click the Details button. The Text Services and Input Languages form will appear. • In the Settings tab, click the Add button • In the Add Input Language form, select Input Language (I selected Japanese) and Keyboard layout/IME Microsoft IME Standard 2002. Click OK on all forms to finish. • In the Taskbar at the lower right of your screen, EN should appear, indicating that you are currently in English mode. • Click on the EN, and you will be offered a choice of all the input methods you currently have installed.

That’s the procedure for Windows XP. I also have an article that tells you.

IAEA experts at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4, 2013 The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster ( 福島第一原子力発電所事故, ( ) genshiryoku hatsudensho jiko) was an at the in, initiated primarily by the following the on 11 March 2011. Immediately after the earthquake, the active reactors their sustained. However, the tsunami disabled the emergency generators that would have provided power to control and operate the pumps necessary to cool the reactors. The led to three,, and the in Units 1, 2, and 3 from 12 March to 15 March. Loss of cooling also caused the pool for storing spent fuel from Reactor 4 to overheat on 15 March due to the from the.

On 5 July 2012, the (NAIIC) found that the causes of the accident had been foreseeable, and that the plant operator, (TEPCO), had failed to meet basic safety requirements such as risk assessment, preparing for containing collateral damage, and developing. On 12 October 2012, that it had failed to take necessary measures for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants. The Fukushima disaster was the most significant nuclear incident since the April 26, 1986 and the second disaster to be given the Level 7 event classification of the.

Though there have been no due to the accident, the eventual number of cancer deaths, according to the theory of radiation safety, that will be caused by the accident is expected to be around 130–640 people in the years and decades ahead. The and report that there will be no increase in miscarriages, stillbirths or physical and mental disorders in babies born after the accident. Controversially however, an estimated 1,600 deaths are believed to have occurred, primarily in the elderly, who had earlier lived in nursing homes, due to the resultant poor ad-hoc evacuation conditions. In 2017 has determined, that unlike Chernobyl, 'relocation was unjustified for the 160,000 people relocated after Fukushima' especially considering these 1,600 deaths that occurred due to the stressful evacuation conditions, when the potential future deaths from exposure to greater amounts of radiation, had everyone instead stayed home and been supported in, would have been less. There are no clear plans for decommissioning the plant, but the plant management estimate is 30 or 40 years.

A frozen soil barrier has been constructed in an attempt to prevent further contamination of seeping groundwater, but in July 2016 TEPCO revealed that the ice wall had failed to totally stop groundwater from flowing in and mixing with highly radioactive water inside the wrecked reactor buildings, adding that they are 'technically incapable of blocking off groundwater with the frozen wall'. In February 2017, TEPCO released images taken inside Reactor 2 by a remote-controlled camera, that show there is a 2-meter (6.5 ft) wide hole in the metal grating under the pressure vessel in the reactor's primary containment vessel, which could have been caused by fuel escaping the pressure vessel, indicating a had occurred, through this layer of containment.

Radiation levels of about 210 per hour were subsequently detected inside the Unit 2 containment vessel. These values are in the context of undamaged which has typical values of 270 Sv/h, after 10-years of, with no shielding. Contents • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Overview [ ] The comprised six separate originally designed by (GE) and maintained by the (TEPCO).

At the time of the on 11 March 2011, Reactors were in preparation for. However, their still required cooling. Immediately after the earthquake, the electricity-producing Reactors 1, 2, and 3 automatically shut down their sustained by inserting in a legally-mandated safety procedure referred to as, which ceases the reactors' normal running conditions. As the reactors were unable to generate power to run their own coolant pumps, emergency diesel generators came online, as designed, to power electronics and coolant systems. These operated nominally until the tsunami destroyed the generators for Reactors 1–5.

The two generators cooling Reactor 6 were undamaged and were sufficient to be pressed into service to cool the neighboring Reactor 5 along with their own reactor, averting the overheating issues that Reactor 4 suffered. The largest tsunami wave was 13 meters (43 ft) high and hit 50 minutes after the initial earthquake, overwhelming the plant's, which was 10 m (33 ft) high. The moment of impact was recorded by a camera. Water quickly flooded the low-lying rooms in which the emergency generators were housed.

The flooded failed soon afterwards, resulting in a loss of power to the critical pumps. These pumps needed to continuously circulate coolant water through a for several days to keep the from melting, as the fuel rods continued to generate after the event.

The fuel rods would become hot enough to melt during the fuel decay time period if an adequate was not available. After the secondary emergency pumps (run by back-up electrical ) ran out, one day after the tsunami, 12 March, the water pumps stopped and the. Meanwhile, as workers struggled to supply power to the reactors' coolant systems and restore power to their, a number of chemical explosions occurred, the first in Unit 1, on 12 March and the last in Unit 4, on 15 March. It is estimated that the hot in Reactors 1–3 produced 800 to 1000 kilograms of hydrogen gas each. The pressurized gas was vented out of the where it mixed with the ambient air, and eventually reached in Units 1 and 3.

Due to piping connections between Units 3 and 4, or alternatively from the same reaction occurring in the in Unit 4 itself, Unit 4 also filled with hydrogen, resulting in an explosion. In each case, the explosions occurred at the top of each unit, that was in their upper secondary. Overflights on 20 March and afterwards captured clear images of the effects of each explosion on the outside structures, while the view inside was largely obscured by shadows and debris. Coinciding with the of a, the insufficient cooling eventually led to in Reactors 1, 2, and 3.

The full extent of the movement of the resulting is unknown but it is now considered to be at least through the bottom of each reactor pressure vessel(RPV), residing somewhere between there and the below each reactor. In a similar manner to what was observed at reactor 4 in.

There have been no reported due to the Fukushima accident, while approximately 18,500 people died due to the earthquake and tsunami. The maximum cancer mortality and morbidity estimate according to the theory is 1,500 and 1,800 but with most estimates considerably lower, in the range of a few hundred. In addition, the rates of psychological distress among evacuated people rose fivefold compared to the Japanese average due to the experience of the disaster and evacuation. In 2013, the (WHO) indicated that the residents of the area who were evacuated were exposed to low amounts of radiation and that radiation-induced health impacts are likely to be low.

In particular, the 2013 WHO report predicts that for evacuated girls, their 0.75% pre-accident lifetime risk of developing is calculated to be increased to 1.25% by being exposed to, with the increase being slightly less for males. The risks from a number of additional are also expected to be elevated due to exposure caused by the other low boiling point that were released by the safety failures. The single greatest increase is for thyroid cancer, but in total, an overall 1% higher lifetime risk of developing cancers of all types, is predicted for infant females, with the risk slightly lower for males, making both some of the most groups. Along with those, which the WHO predicted, depending on their gender, to have the same elevations in risk as the infant groups.

A program a year later in 2012 found that more than a third (36%) of children in have. As of August 2013, there have been more than 40 children newly diagnosed with and other cancers in as a whole.

In 2015, the number of thyroid cancers or detections of developing thyroid cancers numbered 137. However, whether these incidences of cancer are elevated above the rate in un-contaminated areas and therefore were due to exposure to nuclear radiation is unknown at this stage. [ ] Data from the showed that an unmistakable rise in thyroid cancer rates following the disaster in 1986 only began after a cancer incubation period of 3–5 years; however, whether this data can be directly compared to the Fukushima nuclear disaster is yet to be determined. A survey by the newspaper Mainichi Shimbun computed that of some 300,000 people who evacuated the area, approximately 1,600 deaths related to the evacuation conditions, such as living in and hospital closures, had occurred as of August 2013, a number comparable to the 1,599 deaths directly caused by the earthquake and tsunami in the Fukushima Prefecture in 2011. The exact causes of the majority of these evacuation related deaths were not specified, as according to the municipalities, that would hinder application for condolence money by the relatives of the deceased.

On 5 July 2012, the -appointed (NAIIC) submitted its inquiry report to the Japanese Diet. The Commission found the nuclear disaster was 'manmade', that the direct causes of the accident were all foreseeable prior to 11 March 2011. The report also found that the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami. TEPCO, the regulatory bodies ( and NSC) and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements—such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release.

Meanwhile, the government-appointed submitted its final report to the Japanese government on 23 July 2012. A separate study by Stanford researchers found that Japanese plants operated by the largest utility companies were particularly unprotected against potential tsunami.

That it had failed to take stronger measures to prevent disasters for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants. There are no clear plans for decommissioning the plant, but the plant management estimate is thirty or forty years. A frozen soil barrier was constructed in an attempt to prevent further contamination of seeping groundwater by, but in July 2016 TEPCO revealed that the ice wall had failed to stop groundwater from flowing in and mixing with highly radioactive water inside the wrecked reactor buildings, adding that they are 'technically incapable of blocking off groundwater with the frozen wall'. Plant description [ ]. Ortho Flex Saddle Serial Number. Simplified cross-section sketch of a typical BWR Mark I containment as used in units 1 to 5 Key: RPV: reactor pressure vessel DW: enclosing reactor pressure vessel.

WW: wet well - torus-shaped all around the base enclosing steam suppression pool. Excess steam from the dry well enters the wet well water pool via downcomer pipes.

SFP: area SCSW: secondary concrete shield wall The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant consisted of six GE (BWRs) with a combined power of 4.7 gigawatts, making it one of the world's 25 largest. It was the first GE-designed nuclear plant to be constructed and run entirely by the (TEPCO). Reactor 1 was a 439 type (BWR-3) reactor constructed in July 1967, and commenced operation on 26 March 1971. It was designed to withstand an earthquake with a of 0.18 (1.4 m/s 2, 4.6 ft/s 2) and a based on the. Reactors 2 and 3 were both 784 MWe type BWR-4s.

Reactor 2 commenced operation in July 1974, and Reactor 3 in March 1976. The earthquake design basis for all units ranged from 0.42 g (4.12 m/s 2, 13.5 ft/s 2) to 0.46 g (4.52 m/s 2, 14.8 ft/s 2). After the, when the reached 0.125 g (1.22 m/s 2, 4.0 ft/s 2) for 30 seconds, no damage to the critical parts of the reactor was found. Units 1–5 have a (light bulb ); unit 6 has Mark 2-type (over/under) containment structure. In September 2010, Reactor 3 was partially fueled. At the time of the accident, the units and central storage facility contained the following numbers of fuel assemblies: Location Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 Unit 6 Central storage Reactor fuel assemblies 400 548 548 0 548 764 N/A Spent fuel assemblies 292 587 514 1331 946 876 6375 Fuel type UO 2 UO 2 UO 2/MOX UO 2 UO 2 UO 2 UO 2 New fuel assemblies 100 28 52 204 48 64 N/A There was no MOX fuel in any of the cooling ponds at the time of the incident. The only MOX fuel was currently loaded in the Unit 3 reactor.

See also:, and Nuclear reactors generate electricity by using the heat of the to produce steam, which is used to drive turbines in order to generate electricity. When the reactor stops operating, the of unstable isotopes in the fuel continues to generate heat () for a time, and so require continued cooling. Initially this decay heat amounts to approximately 6.5% of the amount produced by fission, decreasing over several days before reaching levels. Afterwards, spent fuel rods typically require several years in a before they can be safely transferred to vessels.

The decay heat in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool had the capacity to boil about 70 metric tons (69 long tons; 77 short tons) of water per day. In the reactor core, high-pressure systems cycle water between the reactor pressure vessel and.

These systems transfer heat to a secondary heat exchanger via the, using water pumped out to sea or an onsite. Units 2 and 3 were equipped with steam turbine-driven that could be directly operated by steam produced by decay heat, and which could inject water directly into the reactor. Some electrical power was needed to operate valves and monitoring systems. Unit 1 was equipped with a different, entirely passive cooling system, the Isolation Condenser (IC).

It consisted of a series of pipes run from the reactor core to the inside of a large tank of water. When the valves are opened, steam flows upward to the IC where the cool water in the tank condenses the steam back to water, and it runs under gravity back to the reactor core. For unknown reasons, Unit 1's IC was operated only intermittently during the emergency.

However, during a 25 March 2014 presentation to the TVA, Dr Takeyuki Inagaki explained that the IC was being operated intermittently to maintain reactor vessel level and to prevent the core from cooling too quickly which can increase reactor power. Unfortunately, as the tsunami engulfed the station, the IC valves were closed and could not be reopened automatically due to the loss of electrical power, but could have been opened manually. On 16 April 2011, TEPCO declared that cooling systems for Units 1–4 were beyond repair. Backup generators [ ] When a reactor is not producing electricity, its cooling pumps can be powered by other reactor units, the grid, diesel generators, or batteries. Two emergency diesel generators were available for each of Units 1–5 and three for Unit 6. In the late 1990s, three additional backup generators for Units 2 and 4 were placed in new buildings located higher on the hillside, to comply with new regulatory requirements.

All six units were given access to these generators, but the switching stations that sent power from these backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems for Units 1 through 5 were still in the poorly protected turbine buildings. The switching station for Unit 6 was protected inside the only GE Mark II reactor building and continued to function. All three of the generators added in the late 1990s were operational after the tsunami. If the switching stations had been moved to inside the reactor buildings or to other flood-proof locations, power would have been provided by these generators to the reactors' cooling systems.

The reactor's emergency diesel generators and DC batteries, crucial components in powering cooling systems after a power loss, were located in the basements of the reactor turbine buildings, in accordance with GE's specifications. Mid-level engineers expressed concerns that this left them vulnerable to flooding. Fukushima I was not designed for such a large tsunami, nor had the reactors been modified when and by the IAEA. Fukushima II was also struck by the tsunami.

However, it had incorporated design changes that improved its resistance to flooding, reducing flood damage. Generators and related electrical distribution equipment were located in the watertight reactor building, so that power from the electricity grid was being used by midnight.

Seawater pumps for cooling were protected from flooding, and although 3 of 4 initially failed, they were restored to operation. Central fuel storage areas [ ] Used fuel assemblies taken from reactors are initially stored for at least 18 months in the pools adjacent to their reactors. They can then be transferred to the central fuel storage pond.

Fukushima I's storage area contains 6375 fuel assemblies. After further cooling, fuel can be transferred to dry cask storage, which has shown no signs of abnormalities. Zircaloy [ ] Many of the internal components and fuel assembly cladding are made from because it is relatively transparent to neutrons. At normal operating temperatures of approximately 300 °C (572 °F), zircaloy is inert. However, above 1,200 degrees Celsius (2,190 °F), zirconium metal can react exothermically with water to form free gas. The reaction between zirconium and the coolant produces more heat, accelerating the reaction. In addition, zircaloy can react with uranium dioxide to form zirconium dioxide and uranium metal.

This exothermic reaction together with the reaction of boron carbide with stainless steel can release additional heat energy, thus contributing to the overheating of a reactor. Prior safety concerns [ ] 1967: Layout of the emergency-cooling system [ ]. The Fukushima reactor control room in 1999 On 27 February 2012, the ordered TEPCO to report its reasoning for changing the piping layout for the emergency cooling system. The original plans separated the piping systems for two reactors in the isolation condenser from each other.

However, the application for approval of the construction plan showed the two piping systems connected outside the reactor. The changes were not noted, in violation of regulations. After the tsunami, the isolation condenser should have taken over the function of the cooling pumps, by condensing the steam from the pressure vessel into water to be used for cooling the reactor. However, the condenser did not function properly and TEPCO could not confirm whether a valve was opened. 1991: Backup generator of Reactor 1 flooded [ ] On 30 October 1991, one of two backup generators of Reactor 1 failed, after flooding in the reactor's basement. Seawater used for cooling leaked into the turbine building from a corroded pipe at 20 cubic meters per hour, as reported by former employees in December 2011. An engineer was quoted as saying that he informed his superiors of the possibility that a tsunami could damage the generators.

TEPCO installed doors to prevent water from leaking into the generator rooms. The stated that it would revise its safety guidelines and would require the installation of additional power sources. On 29 December 2011, TEPCO admitted all these facts: its report mentioned that the room was flooded through a door and some holes for cables, but the power supply was not cut off by the flooding, and the reactor was stopped for one day. One of the two power sources was completely submerged, but its drive mechanism had remained unaffected. 2008: Tsunami study ignored [ ] In 2007, TEPCO set up a department to supervise its nuclear facilities. Until June 2011, its chairman was, the Fukushima Daiichi chief.

A 2008 in-house study identified an immediate need to better protect the facility from flooding by seawater. This study mentioned the possibility of tsunami-waves up to 10.2 meters (33 ft). Headquarters officials insisted that such a risk was unrealistic and did not take the prediction seriously. Okamura of the Active Fault and Earthquake Research Center ( by,, ) urged TEPCO and NISA to review their assumption of possible tsunami heights based on, but it was not seriously considered at that time.

Warned of a risk of losing emergency power in 1991 (NUREG-1150) and NISA referred to the report in 2004. No action to mitigate the risk was taken. Vulnerability to earthquakes [ ] Japan, like the rest of the, is in an active seismic zone, prone to earthquakes. The (IAEA) had expressed concern about the ability of Japan's nuclear plants to withstand earthquakes. At a 2008 meeting of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group in Tokyo, an IAEA expert warned that a strong earthquake with a above 7.0 could pose a 'serious problem' for Japan's nuclear power stations. The region had experienced three earthquakes of magnitude greater than 8, including the, the, and the.

Further information: and Tōhoku earthquake [ ] The 9.0 occurred at 14:46 on Friday, 11 March 2011, with the near, the largest island of Japan. It produced maximum ground of 0.56, 0.52, 0.56 (5.50, 5.07 and 5.48 m/s 2, 18.0, 16.6 and 18.0 ft/s 2) at units 2, 3, and 5 respectively. This exceeded the earthquake tolerances [ ] of 0.45, 0.45, and 0.46 g (4.38, 4.41 and 4.52 m/s 2, 14.4, 14.5 and 14.8 ft/s 2). The shock values were within the design tolerances at units 1, 4, and 6. When the earthquake struck, units 1, 2, and 3 were operating, but units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for a scheduled inspection. Reactors 1, 2, and 3 immediately shut down automatically; this meant the plant stopped generating electricity and could no longer use its own power.

One of the two connections to off-site power for units 1–3 also failed, so 13 on-site emergency diesel generators began providing power. Tsunami and flooding [ ]. The height of the tsunami that struck the station approximately 50 minutes after the earthquake.

A: Power station buildings B: Peak height of tsunami C: Ground level of site D: Average sea level E: Seawall to block waves The earthquake triggered a 13-to-15-meter (43 to 49 ft)-high tsunami that arrived approximately 50 minutes later. The waves overtopped the plant's 5.7-meter (19 ft), flooding the basements of the power plant's turbine buildings and disabling the emergency diesel generators at approximately 15:41.

TEPCO then notified authorities of a 'first-level emergency'. The switching stations that provided power from the three backup generators located higher on the hillside failed when the building that housed them flooded. Power for the plant's control systems switched to batteries designed to provide power for about eight hours. Further batteries and mobile generators were dispatched to the site, but were delayed by poor road conditions; the first arrived at 21:00 11 March, almost six hours after the tsunami struck. Unsuccessful attempts were made to connect portable generating equipment to power water pumps.

The failure was attributed to flooding at the connection point in the Turbine Hall basement and the absence of suitable cables. TEPCO switched its efforts to installing new lines from the grid. One generator at unit 6 resumed operation on 17 March, while external power returned to units 5 and 6 only on 20 March.

Evacuation [ ] The government initially set in place a four-stage evacuation process: a prohibited access area out to 3 km (1.9 mi), an on-alert area 3–20 km (1.9–12.4 mi) and an evacuation prepared area 20–30 km (12–19 mi). On day one, an estimated 170,000 people were evacuated from the prohibited access and on-alert areas. Prime Minister Kan instructed people within the on-alert area to leave and urged those in the prepared area to stay indoors. The latter groups were urged to evacuate on 25 March. The 20 km (12 mi) exclusion zone was guarded by roadblocks to ensure that fewer people would be affected by the radiation.

The earthquake and tsunami damaged or destroyed more than one million buildings leading to a total of 470,000 people needing evacuation. Of the 470,000, the nuclear accident was responsible for 154,000 being evacuated. As of March 2016, of the original 470,000 evacuees, 174,000 remain. Units 1, 2, and 3 [ ]. See also:,, and In Reactors 1, 2, and 3, overheating caused a reaction between the water and the, creating hydrogen gas.

On 12 March, an explosion in Unit 1 was caused by the ignition of the hydrogen, destroying the upper part of the building. On 14 March, a similar explosion occurred in the Reactor 3 building, blowing off the roof and injuring eleven people. On the 15th, there was an explosion in the Reactor 4 building due to a shared vent pipe with Reactor 3. Core meltdowns [ ] The amount of damage sustained by the during the accident, and the location of molten nuclear fuel (') within the, is unknown; TEPCO has revised its estimates several times.

On 16 March 2011, TEPCO estimated that 70% of the fuel in Unit 1 had melted and 33% in Unit 2, and that Unit 3's core might also be damaged. As of 2015 it can be assumed that most fuel melted through the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), commonly known as the 'reactor core') and is resting on the bottom of the primary containment vessel (PCV), having been stopped by the PCV concrete. In July 2017 a remotely controlled robot filmed for the first time apparently melted fuel, just below the pressure vessel of Unit 3. TEPCO released further estimates of the state and location of the fuel in a November 2011 report. The report concluded that the Unit 1 RPV was damaged during the disaster and that 'significant amounts' of molten fuel had fallen into the bottom of the PCV. The erosion of the concrete of the PCV by the molten fuel after the core meltdown was estimated to stop at approx.

0.7 meters (2 ft 4 in) in depth, while the thickness of the containment is 7.6 meters (25 ft) thick. Gas sampling carried out before the report detected no signs of an ongoing reaction of the fuel with the concrete of the PCV and all the fuel in Unit 1 was estimated to be 'well cooled down, including the fuel dropped on the bottom of the reactor'.

Fuel in Units 2 and 3 had melted, however less than in Unit 1, and fuel was presumed to be still in the RPV, with no significant amounts of fuel fallen to the bottom of the PCV. [ ] The report further suggested that 'there is a range in the evaluation results' from 'all fuel in the RPV (none fuel fallen to the PCV)' in Unit 2 and Unit 3, to 'most fuel in the RPV (some fuel in PCV)'.

For Unit 2 and Unit 3 it was estimated that the 'fuel is cooled sufficiently'. According to the report, the greater damage in Unit 1 (when compared to the other two units) was due to the longer time that no cooling water was injected in Unit 1. This resulted in much more accumulating, as for about 1 day there was no water injection for Unit 1, while Unit 2 and Unit 3 had only a quarter of a day without water injection. In November 2013, Mari Yamaguchi reported for Associated Press that there are computer simulations which suggest that 'the melted fuel in Unit 1, whose core damage was the most extensive, has breached the bottom of the primary containment vessel and even partially eaten into its concrete foundation, coming within about 30 centimeters (1 ft) of leaking into the ground' – a Kyoto University nuclear engineer said with regards to these estimates: 'We just can't be sure until we actually see the inside of the reactors.' According to a December 2013 report, TEPCO estimated for Unit 1 that 'the decay heat must have decreased enough, the molten fuel can be assumed to remain in PCV (primary container vessel)'. In August 2014, TEPCO released a new revised estimate that Reactor 3 had a complete melt through in the initial phase of the accident.

According to this new estimate within the first three days of the accident the entire core content of Reactor 3 had melted through the RPV and fallen to the bottom of the PCV. These estimates were based on a simulation, which indicated that Reactor 3's melted core penetrated through 1.2 meters (3 ft 11 in) of the PCV's concrete base, and came close to 26–68 centimeters (10–27 in) of the PCV's steel wall. In February 2015, TEPCO started the process for Units 1, 2, and 3. With this scanning setup it will be possible to determine the approximate amount and location of the remaining nuclear fuel within the RPV, but not the amount and resting place of the corium in the PCV. In March 2015 TEPCO released the result of the muon scan for Unit 1 which showed that no fuel was visible in the RPV, which would suggest that most if not all of the molten fuel had dropped onto the bottom of the PCV – this will change the plan for the removal of the fuel from Unit 1. In February 2017, six years after the disaster, radiation levels inside the Unit 2 containment building were crudely estimated to be about 650 Sv/h.

The estimation was revised later to 80 Sv/h. These readings were the highest recorded since the disaster occurred in 2011 and the first recorded in that area of the reactor since the meltdowns. Images showed a hole in metal grating beneath the reactor pressure vessel, suggesting that melted nuclear fuel had escaped the vessel in that area. Units 4, 5, and 6 [ ]. Aerial view of the station in 1975, showing separation between units 5 and 6, and 1–4. Unit 6, not completed until 1979, is seen under construction. Unit 4 [ ] Reactor 4 was not operating when the earthquake struck.

All fuel rods from Unit 4 had been transferred to the on an upper floor of the reactor building prior to the tsunami. On 15 March, an explosion damaged the fourth floor rooftop area of Unit 4, creating two large holes in a wall of the outer building. It was reported that water in the spent fuel pool might be boiling. Radiation inside the Unit 4 control room prevented workers from staying there for long periods. Visual inspection of the spent fuel pool on 30 April revealed no significant damage to the rods. A radiochemical examination of the pond water confirmed that little of the fuel had been damaged. In October 2012, the former Japanese Ambassador to Switzerland and Senegal, Mitsuhei Murata, said that the ground under Fukushima Unit 4 was sinking, and the structure may collapse.

In November 2013, TEPCO started the process of moving the 1533 fuel rods in the Unit 4 cooling pool to the central pool. This process was completed on 22 December 2014.

Units 5 and 6 [ ] Reactors 5 and 6 were also not operating when the earthquake struck. Unlike Reactor 4, their fuel rods remained in the reactor. The reactors had been closely monitored, as cooling processes were not functioning well. Both Unit 5 and Unit 6 shared a working generator and switchgear during the emergency and achieved a successful cold shutdown nine days later on 20 March. Central fuel storage areas [ ] On 21 March, temperatures in the fuel pond had risen slightly, to 61 °C (142 °F) and water was sprayed over the pool.

Power was restored to cooling systems on 24 March and by 28 March, temperatures were reported down to 35 °C (95 °F). Contamination [ ]. Radiation hotspot in Kashiwa, February 2012 Radioactive material was released from the containment vessels for several reasons: deliberate venting to reduce gas pressure, deliberate discharge of coolant water into the sea, and uncontrolled events. Concerns about the possibility of a large scale release led to a 20-kilometer (12 mi) exclusion zone around the power plant and recommendations that people within the surrounding 20–30 km (12–19 mi) zone stay indoors. Later, the UK, France, and some other countries told their nationals to consider leaving Tokyo, in response to fears of spreading contamination.

In 2015, the tap water contamination was still higher in Tokyo compared to other cities in Japan. Trace amounts of radioactivity, including,, and, were widely observed. Between 21 March and mid-July, around 27 PBq of caesium-137 (about 8.4 kg or 19 lb) entered the ocean, with about 82 percent having flowed into the sea before 8 April. However, the Fukushima coast has some of the world's strongest currents and these transported the contaminated waters far into the, thus causing great dispersion of the radioactive elements. The results of measurements of both the seawater and the coastal sediments led to the supposition that the consequences of the accident, in terms of radioactivity, would be minor for marine life as of autumn 2011 (weak concentration of radioactivity in the water and limited accumulation in sediments).

On the other hand, significant pollution of sea water along the coast near the nuclear plant might persist, due to the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported towards the sea by surface water running over contaminated soil. Organisms that filter water and fish at the top of the food chain are, over time, the most sensitive to caesium pollution.

It is thus justified to maintain surveillance of marine life that is fished in the coastal waters off Fukushima. Despite caesium isotopic concentrations in the waters off of Japan being 10 to 1000 times above the normal concentrations prior to the accident, radiation risks are below what is generally considered harmful to marine animals and human consumers. A monitoring system operated by the (CTBTO) tracked the spread of radioactivity on a global scale.

Radioactive isotopes were picked up by over 40 monitoring stations. On 12 March, radioactive releases first reached a CTBTO monitoring station in Takasaki, Japan, around 200 km (120 mi) away. The radioactive isotopes appeared in eastern Russia on 14 March and the west coast of the United States two days later.

By day 15, traces of radioactivity were detectable all across the northern hemisphere. Within one month, radioactive particles were noted by CTBTO stations in the southern hemisphere. Estimates of radioactivity released ranged from 10–40% of that of Chernobyl. The significantly contaminated area was 10 -12% of that of Chernobyl. In March 2011, Japanese officials announced that 'radioactive iodine-131 exceeding safety limits for infants had been detected at 18 water-purification plants in Tokyo and five other prefectures'. On 21 March, the first restrictions were placed on the distribution and consumption of contaminated items.

As of July 2011, the Japanese government was unable to control the spread of radioactive material into the nation's food supply. Radioactive material was detected in food produced in 2011, including spinach, tea leaves, milk, fish, and beef, up to 320 kilometres from the plant. 2012 crops did not show signs of radioactivity contamination. Cabbage, rice and beef showed insignificant levels of radioactivity.

A Fukushima-produced rice market in Tokyo was accepted by consumers as safe. On 24 August 2011, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) of Japan published the results of the recalculation of the total amount of radioactive materials released into the air during the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. The total amounts released between 11 March and 5 April were revised downwards to 130 PBq (, 3.5 mega) for iodine-131 and 11 PBq for caesium-137, which is about 11% of Chernobyl emissions.

Earlier estimations were 150 PBq and 12 PBq. In 2011, scientists working for the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Kyoto University and other institutes, recalculated the amount of radioactive material released into the ocean: between late March through April they found a total of 15 PBq for the combined amount of iodine-131 and caesium-137, more than triple the 4.72 PBq estimated by TEPCO.

The company had calculated only the direct releases into the sea. The new calculations incorporated the portion of airborne radioactive substances that entered the ocean as rain. In the first half of September 2011, TEPCO estimated the radioactivity release at some 200 MBq (megabecquerels, 5.4 milli) per hour. This was approximately one four-millionth that of March. Traces of iodine-131 were detected in several Japanese prefectures in November and December 2011. According to the, between 21 March and mid-July around 27 PBq of caesium-137 entered the ocean, about 82 percent before 8 April. This emission represents the most important individual oceanic emissions of artificial radioactivity ever observed.

The Fukushima coast has one of the world's strongest currents (). It transported the contaminated waters far into the Pacific Ocean, dispersing the radioactivity. As of late 2011 measurements of both the seawater and the coastal sediments suggested that the consequences for marine life would be minor.

Significant pollution along the coast near the plant might persist, because of the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported to the sea by surface water crossing contaminated soil. The possible presence of other radioactive substances, such as or, has not been sufficiently studied. Recent measurements show persistent contamination of some marine species (mostly fish) caught along the Fukushima coast. Migratory are highly effective and rapid transporters of radioactivity throughout the ocean. Elevated levels of caesium-134 appeared in migratory species off the coast of California that were not seen pre-Fukushima.

As of March 2012, no cases of radiation-related ailments had been reported. Experts cautioned that data was insufficient to allow conclusions on health impacts. Michiaki Kai, professor of radiation protection at, stated, 'If the current radiation dose estimates are correct, (cancer-related deaths) likely won't increase.' In May 2012, TEPCO released their estimate of cumulative radioactivity releases. An estimated 538.1 PBq of iodine-131, caesium-134 and caesium-137 was released.

520 PBq was released into the atmosphere between 12–31 March 2011 and 18.1 PBq into the ocean from 26 March – 30 September 2011. A total of 511 PBq of iodine-131 was released into both the atmosphere and the ocean, 13.5 PBq of caesium-134 and 13.6 PBq of caesium-137. TEPCO reported that at least 900 PBq had been released 'into the atmosphere in March last year [2011] alone'. In 2012 researchers from the Institute of Problems in the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Hydrometeorological Center of Russia concluded that 'on March 15, 2011, ~400 PBq iodine, ~100 PBq cesium, and ~400 PBq inert gases entered the atmosphere' on that day alone. In August 2012, researchers found that 10,000 nearby residents had been exposed to less than 1 of radiation, significantly less than Chernobyl residents.

As of October 2012, radioactivity was still leaking into the ocean. Fishing in the waters around the site was still prohibited, and the levels of radioactive 134Cs and 137Cs in the fish caught were not lower than immediately after the disaster. On 26 October 2012, TEPCO admitted that it could not stop radioactive material entering the ocean, although emission rates had stabilized. Undetected leaks could not be ruled out, because the reactor basements remained flooded. The company was building a 2,400-foot-long steel and concrete wall between the site and the ocean, reaching 100 feet (30 m) below ground, but it would not be finished before mid-2014.

Around August 2012 two were caught close to shore. They contained more than 25,000 becquerels (0.67 milli) of caesium-137 per kilogram (11,000 /; 0.31 /lb), the highest measured since the disaster and 250 times the government's safety limit. On 22 July 2013, it was revealed by TEPCO that the plant continued to leak radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean, something long suspected by local fishermen and independent investigators. TEPCO had previously denied that this was happening. Japanese Prime Minister ordered the government to step in. On 20 August, in a further incident, it was announced that 300 metric tons (300 long tons; 330 short tons) of heavily contaminated water had leaked from a storage tank, approximately the same amount of water as one eighth (1/8) of that found in an.

The 300 metric tons (300 long tons; 330 short tons) of water was radioactive enough to be hazardous to nearby staff, and the leak was assessed as Level 3 on the. On 26 August, the government took charge of emergency measures to prevent further radioactive water leaks, reflecting their lack of confidence in TEPCO. As of 2013, about 400 metric tons (390 long tons; 440 short tons) of water per day of cooling water was being pumped into the reactors. Another 400 metric tons (390 long tons; 440 short tons) of groundwater was seeping into the structure. Some 800 metric tons (790 long tons; 880 short tons) of water per day was removed for treatment, half of which was reused for cooling and half diverted to storage tanks. Ultimately the contaminated water, after treatment to remove radionuclides other than, may have to be dumped into the Pacific.

TEPCO intend to create an underground ice wall to reduce the rate contaminated groundwater reaches the sea. In February 2014, NHK reported that TEPCO was reviewing its radioactivity data, after finding much higher levels of radioactivity than was reported earlier. TEPCO now says that levels of 5 MBq (0.12 milli) of strontium per liter (23 /; 19 MBq/; 610 /imp gal; 510 μCi/U.S. gal) were detected in groundwater collected in July 2013 and not the 900 kBq (0.02 milli) (4.1 /; 3.4 MBq/; 110 /imp gal; 92 μCi/U.S. gal) that were initially reported. On 10 September 2015, floodwaters driven by Typhoon Etau prompted mass evacuations in Japan and overwhelmed the drainage pumps at the stricken Fukushima nuclear plant. A TEPCO spokesperson said that hundreds of metric tons of radioactive water had entered the ocean as a result.

Plastic bags filled with contaminated soil and grass were also swept away by the flood waters. Contamination in the eastern Pacific [ ] In March 2014, numerous news sources, including, began predicting that the radioactive underwater traveling through the Pacific Ocean would reach the western seaboard of the. The common story was that the amount of radioactivity would be harmless and temporary once it arrived. The measured cesium-134 at points in the Pacific Ocean and models were cited in predictions by several government agencies to announce that the radiation would not be a health hazard for North American residents. Groups, including and the Tillamook Estuaries Partnership, challenged these predictions on the basis of continued isotope releases after 2011, leading to a demand for more recent and comprehensive measurements as the radioactivity made its way east. These measurements were taken by a cooperative group of organizations under the guidance of a marine chemist with the, and it was revealed that total radiation levels, of which only a fraction bore the fingerprint of Fukushima, were not high enough to pose any direct risk to human life and in fact were far less than guidelines or several other sources of radiation exposure deemed safe.

Integrated Fukushima Ocean Radionuclide Monitoring project (InFORM) also failed to show any significant amount of radiation and as a result authors received death threats from supporters of a Fukushima-induced 'wave of cancer deaths across North America' theory. Response [ ]. See also: Government agencies and TEPCO were unprepared for the 'cascading nuclear disaster'. The tsunami that 'began the nuclear disaster could and should have been anticipated and that ambiguity about the roles of public and private institutions in such a crisis was a factor in the poor response at Fukushima'. In March 2012, Prime Minister said that the government shared the blame for the Fukushima disaster, saying that officials had been blinded by a false belief in the country's 'technological infallibility', and were taken in by a 'safety myth'.

Noda said 'Everybody must share the pain of responsibility.' According to, Japan's prime minister during the tsunami, the country was unprepared for the disaster, and nuclear power plants should not have been built so close to the ocean. Kan acknowledged flaws in authorities' handling of the crisis, including poor communication and coordination between nuclear regulators, utility officials, and the government. He said the disaster 'laid bare a host of an even bigger man-made vulnerabilities in Japan's nuclear industry and regulation, from inadequate safety guidelines to crisis management, all of which he said need to be overhauled.' Physicist and environmentalist said that Japan's 'rigid bureaucratic structures, reluctance to send bad news upwards, need to save face, weak development of policy alternatives, eagerness to preserve nuclear power's public acceptance, and politically fragile government, along with TEPCO's very hierarchical management culture, also contributed to the way the accident unfolded.

Moreover, the information Japanese people receive about nuclear energy and its alternatives has long been tightly controlled by both TEPCO and the government.' Poor communication and delays [ ] The Japanese government did not keep records of key meetings during the crisis. Data from the were emailed to the prefectural government, but not shared with others.

Emails from NISA to Fukushima, covering 12 March 11:54 PM to 16 March 9 AM and holding vital information for evacuation and health advisories, went unread and were deleted. The data was not used because the disaster countermeasure office regarded the data as 'useless because the predicted amount of released radiation is unrealistic.' On 14 March 2011 TEPCO officials were instructed not to use the phrase 'core meltdown' at press conferences.

On the evening of March 15, Prime Minister Kan called Seiki Soramoto, who used to design nuclear plants for Toshiba, to ask for his help in managing the escalating crisis. Soramoto formed an impromptu advisory group, which included his former professor at the University of Tokyo, Toshiso Kosako, a top Japanese expert on radiation measurement. Kosako, who studied the Soviet response to the Chernobyl crisis, said he was stunned at how little the leaders in the prime minister’s office knew about the resources available to them. He quickly advised the chief cabinet secretary, Yukio Edano, to use SPEEDI, which used measurements of radioactive releases, as well as weather and topographical data, to predict where radioactive materials could travel after being released into the atmosphere. The 's interim report stated that Japan's response was flawed by 'poor communication and delays in releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at the facility'. The report blamed Japan's central government as well as TEPCO, 'depicting a scene of harried officials incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks following the disaster'. The report said poor planning worsened the disaster response, noting that authorities had 'grossly underestimated tsunami risks' that followed the magnitude 9.0 earthquake.

The 12.1-meter (40 ft) high tsunami that struck the plant was double the height of the highest wave predicted by officials. The erroneous assumption that the plant's cooling system would function after the tsunami worsened the disaster. 'Plant workers had no clear instructions on how to respond to such a disaster, causing miscommunication, especially when the disaster destroyed backup generators.' In February 2012, the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation described how Japan's response was hindered by a loss of trust between the major actors: Prime Minister Kan, TEPCO's Tokyo headquarters and the plant manager. The report said that these conflicts 'produced confused flows of sometimes contradictory information'.

According to the report, Kan delayed the cooling of the reactors by questioning the choice of seawater instead of fresh water, accusing him of micromanaging response efforts and appointing a small, closed, decision-making staff. The report stated that the Japanese government was slow to accept assistance from U.S. Nuclear experts. A 2012 report in said: 'The operating company was poorly regulated and did not know what was going on. The operators made mistakes. The representatives of the safety inspectorate fled.

Some of the equipment failed. The establishment repeatedly played down the risks and suppressed information about the movement of the radioactive plume, so some people were evacuated from more lightly to more heavily contaminated places.' From 17 to 19 March 2011, US military aircraft measured radiation within a 45 km (28 mi) radius of the site.

The data recorded 125 micro per hour of radiation as far as 25 km (15.5 mi) northwest of the plant. The US provided detailed maps to the Japanese (METI) on 18 March and to the (MEXT) two days later, but officials did not act on the information. The data were not forwarded to the prime minister's office or the (NSC), nor were they used to direct the evacuation. Because a substantial portion of radioactive materials reached ground to the northwest, residents evacuated in this direction were unnecessarily exposed to radiation. According to NSC chief Tetsuya Yamamoto, 'It was very regrettable that we didn't share and utilize the information.' Itaru Watanabe, from the Science and Technology Policy Bureau, blamed the US for not releasing the data.

Data on the dispersal of radioactive materials were provided to the U.S. Forces by the Japanese Ministry for Science a few days after March 11; however, the data was not shared publicly until the Americans published their map on March 23, at which point Japan published fallout maps compiled from ground measurements and SPEEDI the same day. According to Watanabe's testimony before the Diet, the US military was given access to the data 'to seek support from them' on how to deal with the nuclear disaster. Although SPEEDI's effectiveness was limited by not knowing the amounts released in the disaster, and thus was considered 'unreliable', it was still able to forecast dispersal routes and could have been used to help local governments designate more appropriate evacuation routes. On 19 June 2012, science minister Hirofumi Hirano stated that his 'job was only to measure radiation levels on land' and that the government would study whether disclosure could have helped in the evacuation efforts. On 28 June 2012 officials apologized to mayor Yuko Endo of Kawauchi Village for NISA having failed to release the American-produced radiation maps in the first days after the meltdowns.

All residents of this village were evacuated after the government designated it a no-entry zone. According to a Japanese government panel, authorities had shown no respect for the lives and dignity of village people. One NISA official apologized for the failure and added that the panel had stressed the importance of disclosure; however, the mayor said that the information would have prevented the evacuation into highly polluted areas, and that apologies a year too late had no meaning. In June 2016, it was revealed that TEPCO officials had been instructed on 14 March 2011 not to describe the reactor damage using the word 'meltdown'. Officials at that time were aware that 25–55% of the fuel had been damaged, and the threshold for which the term 'meltdown' became appropriate (5%) had been greatly exceeded. TEPCO President Naomi Hirose told the media: 'I would say it was a cover-up.

It’s extremely regrettable.” Event rating [ ]. Comparison of radiation levels for different nuclear events The incident was rated 7 on the (INES). This scale runs from 0, indicating an abnormal situation with no safety consequences, to 7, indicating an accident causing widespread contamination with serious health and environmental effects.

Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level 7 event on record, while the was rated as level 5. A 2012 analysis of the intermediate and long-lived radioactivity released found about 10–20% of that released from the Chernobyl disaster. Approximately 15 of was released, compared with approximately 85 PBq of caesium-137 at Chernobyl, indicating the release of 26.5 kilograms (58 lb) of caesium-137.

Unlike Chernobyl, all Japanese reactors were in concrete containment vessels, which limited the release of,, and, which were among the released by the earlier incident. Some 500 PBq of were released, compared to approximately 1,760 PBq at Chernobyl. Iodine-131 has a of 8.02 days, decaying into a stable nuclide. After ten half lives (80.2 days), 99.9% has decayed to, a stable isotope. Aftermath [ ]. Main article: No deaths followed short-term radiation exposure, though there were a number of deaths in the evacuation of the nearby population, while 15,884 died (as of 10 February 2014 ) due to the earthquake and tsunami.

Risks from radiation [ ] Very few cancers would be expected as a result of accumulated radiation exposures, even though people in the area worst affected by Japan's Fukushima nuclear accident have a slightly higher risk of developing certain cancers such as,,, and. Estimated effective doses from the accident outside Japan are considered to be below (or far below) the dose levels regarded as very small by the international radiological protection community. In 2013, WHO reported that area residents who were evacuated were exposed to so little radiation that radiation-induced health effects were likely to be below detectable levels. The health risks were calculated by applying conservative assumptions, including the conservative model of radiation exposure, a model that assumes even the smallest amount of radiation exposure will cause a negative health effect. The report indicated that for those infants in the most affected areas, lifetime cancer risk would increase by about 1%. It predicted that populations in the most contaminated areas faced a 70% higher relative risk of developing thyroid cancer for females exposed as infants, and a 7% higher relative risk of leukemia in males exposed as infants and a 6% higher relative risk of breast cancer in females exposed as infants. One-third of involved emergency workers would have increased cancer risks.

Cancer risks for were similar to those in 1 year old infants. The estimated cancer risk to children and adults was lower than infants. These percentages represent estimated relative increases over the baseline rates and are not absolute risks for developing such cancers. Due to the low baseline rates of thyroid cancer, even a large relative increase represents a small absolute increase in risks.

For example, the baseline lifetime risk of thyroid cancer for females is just three-quarters of one percent and the additional lifetime risk estimated in this assessment for a female infant exposed in the most affected location is one-half of one percent. — World Health Organization. Archived from (PDF) on 2013-10-22.

According to a (LNT model), the accident would most likely cause 130 cancer deaths. However, radiation epidemiologist Roy Shore countered that estimating health effects from the LNT model 'is not wise because of the uncertainties.' Darshak Sanghavi noted that to obtain reliable evidence of the effect of low-level radiation would require an impractically large number of patients, Luckey reported that the body's own repair mechanisms can cope with small doses of radiation and Aurengo stated that “The LNT model cannot be used to estimate the effect of very low doses” In April 2014, studies confirmed the presence of radioactive tuna off the coasts of the Pacific U.S. Researchers carried out tests on 26 caught prior to the 2011 power plant disaster and those caught after.

However, the amount of radioactivity is less than that found naturally in a single banana. And have been noted in in Tokyo Bay as of 2016. 'Concentration of radiocesium in the Japanese whiting was one or two orders of magnitude higher than that in the sea water, and an lower than that in the sediment.' They were still within food safety limits. In June 2016, co-president of the group, the ' argues that 174,000 people have been unable to return to their homes and ecological diversity has decreased and malformations have been found in trees, birds, and mammals.

Five years after the event, the Department of Agriculture from the University of Tokyo (which holds many experimental agricultural research fields around the affected area) has noted that 'the fallout was found at the surface of anything exposed to air at the time of the accident. Xbox 360 Wireless Adapter Driver Windows 7 on this page. The main radioactive nuclides are now and ', but these radioactive compounds have not dispersed much from the point where they landed at the time of the explosion, 'which was very difficult to estimate from our understanding of the chemical behavior of cesium'. Thyroid screening program [ ] The World Health Organization stated that a 2013 ultrasound screening program was, due to the, likely to lead to an increase in recorded thyroid cases due to early detection of non- disease cases. The overwhelming majority of thyroid growths are benign growths that will never cause symptoms, illness, or death, even if nothing is ever done about the growth. Studies on people who died from other causes show that more than one third of adults technically have a thyroid growth/cancer.

As a precedent, in 1999 in, the introduction of advanced thyroid examinations resulted in an explosion in the rate of thyroid cancers being detected and needless surgeries occurring. Despite this, the death rate from thyroid cancer has remained the same. According to the Tenth Report of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey released in February 2013, more than 40% of children screened around Fukushima prefecture were diagnosed with thyroid nodules or cysts. Ultrasonographic detectable thyroid nodules and cysts are extremely common and can be found at a frequency of up to 67% in various studies. 186 (0.5%) of these had nodules larger than 5.1 mm (0.20 in) and/or cysts larger than 20.1 mm (0.79 in) and underwent further investigation, while none had thyroid cancer.

A report into the matter was highly misleading. Fukushima Medical University give the number of children diagnosed with thyroid cancer, as of December 2013, as 33 and concluded 'it is unlikely that these cancers were caused by the exposure from I-131 from the nuclear power plant accident in March 2011'. In October 2015, 137 children from the Fukushima Prefecture were described as either being diagnosed with or showing signs of developing thyroid cancer. The study's lead author Toshihide Tsuda from stated that the increased detection could not be accounted for by attributing it to the. He described the screening results to be '20 times to 50 times what would be normally expected.'

By the end of 2015, the number had increased to 166 children. However, despite his paper being widely reported by the media, an undermining error, according to teams of other epidemiologists who point out Tsuda's remarks are fatally wrong, is that Tsuda did an comparison by comparing the Fukushima surveys, which uses advanced ultrasound devices that detect otherwise unnoticeable thyroid growths, with data from traditional non-advanced clinical examinations, to arrive at his '20 to 50 times what would be expected' conclusion. In the critical words of epidemiologist Richard Wakeford, “It is inappropriate to compare the data from the Fukushima screening program with cancer registry data from the rest of Japan where there is, in general, no such large-scale screening,”. Wakeford's criticism was one of seven other author's letters that were published criticizing Tsuda's paper.

According to Takamura, another epidemiologist, who examined the results of small scale advanced ultrasound tests on Japanese children not near Fukushima, 'The prevalence of thyroid cancer [using the same detection technology] does not differ meaningfully from that in Fukushima Prefecture,”. Is one of the most survivable cancers, with an approximate after first diagnosis. That rate increases to a nearly 100% survival rate if caught early.

Chernobyl comparison [ ]. Main article: Radiation deaths at Chernobyl were also statistically undetectable. Only 0.1% of the 110,645 Ukraninian cleanup workers, included in a 20-year study out of over 500,000 former Soviet clean up workers, had as of 2012 developed leukemia, although not all cases resulted from the accident. Data from Chernobyl showed that there was a steady then sharp increase in thyroid cancer rates following the disaster in 1986, but whether this data can be directly compared to Fukushima is yet to be determined. Chernobyl thyroid cancer incidence rates did not begin to increase above the prior baseline value of about 0.7 cases per 100,000 people per year until 1989 to 1991, 3–5 years after the incident in both adolescent and child age groups.

The rate reached its highest point so far, of about 11 cases per 100,000 in the decade of the 2000s, approximately 14 years after the accident. From 1989 to 2005, an excess of 4,000 children and adolescent cases of thyroid cancer were observed. Nine of these had died as of 2005, a 99% survival rate. Effects on evacuees [ ] In the former, many patients with negligible radioactive exposure after the Chernobyl disaster displayed extreme anxiety about radiation exposure.

They developed many problems, including along with an increase in. As Japanese health and radiation specialist Shunichi Yamashita noted: We know from Chernobyl that the consequences are enormous. Life expectancy of the evacuees dropped from 65 to 58 years – not because of cancer, but because of, alcoholism, and. Relocation is not easy, the is very big. We must not only track those problems, but also treat them. Otherwise people will feel they are just guinea pigs in our research. A survey by the local government obtained responses from approximately 1,743 evacuees within the evacuation zone.

The survey showed that many residents are experiencing growing frustration, instability, and an inability to return to their earlier lives. Sixty percent of respondents stated that their health and the health of their families had deteriorated after evacuating, while 39.9% reported feeling more irritated compared to before the disaster.

Summarizing all responses to questions related to evacuees' current family status, one-third of all surveyed families live apart from their children, while 50.1% live away from other family members (including elderly parents) with whom they lived before the disaster. The survey also showed that 34.7% of the evacuees have suffered salary cuts of 50% or more since the outbreak of the nuclear disaster. A total of 36.8% reported a lack of sleep, while 17.9% reported smoking or drinking more than before they evacuated. Stress often manifests in physical ailments, including behavioral changes such as poor dietary choices, lack of exercise, and sleep deprivation.

Survivors, including some who lost homes, villages, and family members, were found likely to face mental health and physical challenges. Much of the stress came from lack of information and from relocation. A survey computed that of some 300,000 evacuees, approximately 1,600 deaths related to the evacuation conditions, such as living in and hospital closures that had occurred as of August 2013, a number comparable to the 1,599 deaths directly caused by the earthquake and tsunami in the Prefecture. The exact causes of these evacuation related deaths were not specified, because according to the municipalities, that would hinder relatives applying for compensation.

Radioactivity releases [ ] In June 2011, TEPCO stated the amount of contaminated water in the complex had increased due to substantial rainfall. On 13 February 2014, reported 37 kBq (1.0 micro) of and 93 kBq (2.5 micro) of were detected per liter of groundwater sampled from a monitoring well.

Insurance [ ] According to, the private insurance industry will not be significantly affected by the disaster. Similarly stated, 'Coverage for nuclear facilities in Japan excludes earthquake shock, fire following earthquake and tsunami, for both physical damage and liability. Swiss Re believes that the incident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant is unlikely to result in a significant direct loss for the property & casualty insurance industry.' [ ] Compensation [ ] The amount of compensation to be paid by TEPCO is expected to reach 7 trillion yen. Costs to Japanese taxpayers are likely to exceed 12 trillion yen ($100 billion). In December 2016 the government estimated decontamination, compensation, decommissioning, and radioactive waste storage costs at 21.5 trillion yen ($187 billion), nearly double the 2013 estimate. In March 2017, a Japanese court ruled that negligence by the Japanese government had led to the Fukushima disaster by failing to use its regulatory powers to force TEPCO to take preventive measures.

The Maebashi district court near Tokyo awarded ¥39 million ( US$345,000) to 137 people who were forced to flee their homes following the accident. Energy policy implications [ ]. Anti-nuclear power plant rally on 19 September 2011 at the complex in Tokyo By March 2012, one year after the disaster, all but two of Japan's nuclear reactors had been shut down; some had been damaged by the quake and tsunami.

Authority to restart the others after scheduled maintenance throughout the year was given to local governments, who in all cases decided against. According to, the disaster changed the national debate over energy policy almost overnight. 'By shattering the government's long-pitched safety myth about nuclear power, the crisis dramatically raised public awareness about energy use and sparked strong sentiment'.

An energy white paper, approved by the Japanese Cabinet in October 2011, says 'public confidence in safety of nuclear power was greatly damaged' by the disaster and called for a reduction in the nation's reliance on nuclear power. It also omitted a section on nuclear power expansion that was in the previous year's policy review. Michael Banach, the current representative to the IAEA, told a conference in Vienna in September 2011 that the disaster created new concerns about the safety of nuclear plants globally. Auxiliary Bishop of Osaka Michael Goro Matsuura said this incident should cause Japan and other countries to abandon nuclear projects. He called on the worldwide Christian community to support this anti-nuclear campaign.

Statements from Bishops' conferences in Korea and the Philippines called on their governments to abandon atomic power. Author, who received a in, urged Japan to abandon its reactors.

The nuclear plant closest to the of the earthquake, the, successfully withstood the cataclysm. According to it may serve as a 'trump card' for the nuclear lobby, providing evidence that it is possible for a correctly designed and operated nuclear facility to withstand such a cataclysm. The loss of 30% of the country's generating capacity led to much greater reliance on and.

Unusual conservation measures were undertaken. In the immediate aftermath, nine prefectures served by TEPCO experienced power rationing. The government asked major companies to reduce power consumption by 15%, and some shifted their weekends to weekdays to smooth power demand.

Converting to a nuclear-free gas and energy economy would cost tens of billions of dollars in annual fees. One estimate is that even including the disaster, more lives would have been lost if Japan had used coal or gas plants instead of nuclear. Many political activists have begun calling for a phase-out of nuclear power in Japan, including, who claimed, 'Japan is poor in fuels, but is the richest of all major industrial countries in renewable energy that can meet the entire long-term energy needs of an energy-efficient Japan, at lower cost and risk than current plans.

Japanese industry can do it faster than anyone — if Japanese policymakers acknowledge and allow it'. Asserted that Japan could have exploited instead its base. Japan has a total of '324 GW of achievable potential in the form of onshore and offshore (222 GW), plants (70 GW), additional hydroelectric capacity (26.5 GW), solar energy (4.8 GW) and agricultural residue (1.1 GW).' In contrast, others have said that the zero mortality rate from the Fukushima incident confirms their opinion that is the only viable option available to replace. Journalist wrote 'Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power.'

In it he said, 'As a result of the disaster at Fukushima, I am no longer nuclear-neutral. I now support the technology.' He continued, 'A crappy old plant with inadequate safety features was hit by a monster earthquake and a vast tsunami. The electricity supply failed, knocking out the cooling system.

The reactors began to explode and melt down. The disaster exposed a familiar legacy of poor design and corner-cutting. Yet, as far as we know, no one has yet received a lethal dose of radiation.' In September 2011, said that the disaster can be understood as a unique chance 'to get it right' on. 'Germany – with its nuclear phase-out decision based on a program – and Japan – having suffered a painful shock but possessing unique technical capacities and societal discipline – can be at the forefront of an authentic paradigm shift toward a truly sustainable, low-carbon and nuclear-free energy policy.'

On the other hand, climate and energy scientists,,, and released an open letter calling on world leaders to support development of safer nuclear power systems, stating 'There is no credible path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power.' In December 2014, an open letter from 75 climate and energy scientists concluding 'nuclear power has lowest impact on wildlife and ecosystems — which is what we need given the dire state of the world’s biodiversity.' As of September 2011, Japan planned to build a pilot offshore, with six 2 MW turbines, off the. The first became operational in November 2013. After the evaluation phase is complete in 2016, 'Japan plans to build as many as 80 floating wind turbines off Fukushima by 2020.' In 2012, Prime Minister Kan said the disaster made it clear to him that 'Japan needs to dramatically reduce its dependence on nuclear power, which supplied 30% of its electricity before the crisis, and has turned him into a believer of renewable energy'.

[ ] Sales of solar panels in Japan rose 30.7% to 1,296 MW in 2011, helped by a government scheme to promote renewable energy. Received financing for its plans to build a factory in Japan with capacity of 150 MW, scheduled to begin production in 2014. As of September 2012, the reported that 'Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda acknowledged that the vast majority of Japanese support the zero option on nuclear power', and Prime Minister Noda and the Japanese government announced plans to make the country nuclear-free by the 2030s. They announced the end to construction of nuclear power plants and a 40-year limit on existing nuclear plants.

Nuclear plant restarts must meet safety standards of the new independent regulatory authority. The plan requires investing $500 billion over 20 years. On 16 December 2012, Japan held its. The (LDP) had a clear victory, with as the new.

Abe supported nuclear power, saying that leaving the plants closed was costing the country 4 trillion yen per year in higher costs. The comment came after, who chose Abe to succeed him as premier, made a recent statement to urge the government to take a stance against using nuclear power. A survey on local mayors by the newspaper in January 2013 found that most of them from cities hosting nuclear plants would agree to restarting the reactors, provided the government could guarantee their safety. More than 30,000 people marched on 2 June 2013, in Tokyo against restarting nuclear power plants. Marchers had gathered more than 8 million petition signatures opposing nuclear power. In October 2013, it was reported that TEPCO and eight other Japanese power companies were paying approximately 3.6 trillion (37 billion ) more in combined imported fossil fuel costs compared to 2010, before the accident, to make up for the missing power.

Equipment, facility, and operational changes [ ] As the crisis unfolded, the Japanese government sent a request for robots developed by the U.S. The robots went into the plants and took pictures to help assess the situation, but they couldn't perform the full range of tasks usually carried out by human workers. The Fukushima disaster illustrated that robots lacked sufficient dexterity and robustness to perform critical tasks. In response to this shortcoming, a series of competitions were hosted by to accelerate the development of that could supplement relief efforts. Eventually a wide variety of specially designed robots were employed (leading to a robotics boom in the region), but as of early 2016 three of them had promptly become non-functional due to the intensity of the radioactivity; one was destroyed within a day. A number of lessons emerged from the incident. The most obvious was that in tsunami-prone areas, a power station's must be adequately tall and robust.

At the, closer to the epicenter of 11 March earthquake and tsunami, the sea wall was 14 meters (46 ft) tall and successfully withstood the tsunami, preventing serious damage and radioactivity releases. Nuclear power station operators around the world began to install Passive Auto-catalytic hydrogen Recombiners ('PARs'), which do not require electricity to operate. PARs work much like the on the exhaust of a car to turn potentially explosive gases such as hydrogen into water. Had such devices been positioned at the top of Fukushima I's reactor and containment buildings, where hydrogen gas collected, the explosions would not have occurred and the releases of radioactive isotopes would arguably have been much less. Unpowered filtering systems on vent lines, known as (FCVS), can safely catch radioactive materials and thereby allow reactor core de-pressurization, with steam and hydrogen venting with minimal radioactivity emissions. Filtration using an external water tank system is the most common established system in European countries, with the water tank positioned outside the.

In October 2013, the owners of began installing wet filters and other safety systems, with completion anticipated in 2014. For located in flood or tsunami prone areas, a 3+ day supply of back-up batteries has become an informal industry standard. Another change is to harden the location of back-up diesel generator rooms with water-tight, blast-resistant doors and, similar to those used. The oldest operating nuclear power station in the world,, which has been operating since 1969, has a 'Notstand' hardened building designed to support all of its systems independently for 72 hours in the event of an earthquake or severe flooding. This system was built prior to Fukushima Daiichi. Upon a, similar to the one that occurred after Fukushima's back-up battery supply was exhausted, many constructed adopt the principle of.

They take advantage of (hot water tends to rise) and (water tends to fall) to ensure an adequate supply of cooling water to handle the, without the use of pumps. Reactions [ ] Japan [ ]. Japan towns, villages, and cities in and around the Daiichi nuclear plant exclusion zone.

The 20 and 30 km (12 and 19 mi) areas had evacuation and orders, and additional administrative districts that had an evacuation order are highlighted. However, the above map's factual accuracy is called into question as only the southern portion of district had evacuation orders. More accurate maps are available. Japanese authorities later admitted to lax standards and poor oversight.

They took fire for their handling of the emergency and engaged in a pattern of withholding and denying damaging information. Authorities allegedly [ – ] wanted to 'limit the size of costly and disruptive evacuations in land-scarce Japan and to avoid public questioning of the politically powerful nuclear industry'. Public anger emerged over an 'official campaign [ ] [ ] to play down the scope of the accident and the potential health risks'.

In many cases, the Japanese government's reaction was judged to be less than adequate by many in Japan, especially those who were living in the region. Decontamination equipment was slow to be made available and then slow to be utilized. As late as June 2011, even rainfall continued to cause fear and uncertainty in eastern Japan because of its possibility of washing radioactivity from the sky back to earth.

[ ] To assuage fears, the government enacted an order to over a hundred areas with a level contamination greater than or equivalent to one [ ] of radiation. This is a much lower threshold than is necessary for protecting health.

The government also sought to address the lack of education on the effects of radiation and the extent to which the average person was exposed. Previously a proponent of building more reactors, Kan took an increasingly stance following the disaster. In May 2011, he ordered the aging closed over earthquake and tsunami concerns, and said he would freeze building plans.

In July 2011, Kan said, 'Japan should reduce and eventually eliminate its dependence on nuclear energy'. In October 2013, he said that if the worst-case scenario had been realized, 50 million people within a 250-kilometer (160 mi) radius would have had to evacuate.

On 22 August 2011, a government spokesman mentioned the possibility that some areas around the plant 'could stay for some decades a forbidden zone'. According to Yomiuri Shimbun the Japanese government was planning to buy some properties from civilians to store waste and materials that had become radioactive after the accidents.

Chiaki Takahashi, Japan's foreign minister, criticized foreign media reports as excessive. He added that he could 'understand the concerns of foreign countries over recent developments at the nuclear plant, including the of seawater'. Due to frustration with TEPCO and the Japanese government 'providing differing, confusing, and at times contradictory, information on critical health issues' a citizen's group called ' recorded detailed radiation level data in Japan. The Japanese government 'does not consider nongovernment readings to be authentic'. The group uses off-the-shelf equipment. A simple is a meter and not a dose rate meter. The response differs too much between different radioisotopes to permit a simple GM tube for dose rate measurements when more than one radioisotope is present.

A thin metal shield is needed around a GM tube to provide energy compensation to enable it to be used for dose rate measurements. For gamma emitters either an ionization chamber, a gamma spectrometer or an energy compensated GM tube are required. Members of the Air Monitoring station facility at the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the, California have tested many environmental samples in Northern California. In 2014 Japan enacted the. The Fukushima incident falls under this law and, as a 'state secret', independent investigations and reports are forbidden by law. International [ ].

Navy humanitarian flight undergoes radioactive decontamination The international reaction to the disaster was diverse and widespread. Many inter-governmental agencies immediately offered help, often on an ad hoc basis. Responders included IAEA, and the Preparatory Commission for the. In May 2011, UK chief inspector of nuclear installations Mike Weightman traveled to Japan as the lead of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expert mission. The main finding of this mission, as reported to the IAEA ministerial conference that month, was that risks associated with tsunamis in several sites in Japan had been underestimated.

In September 2011, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said the Japanese nuclear disaster 'caused deep public anxiety throughout the world and damaged confidence in nuclear power'. Following the disaster, it was reported in The Economist that the IAEA halved its estimate of additional nuclear generating capacity to be built by 2035. In the aftermath, Germany accelerated plans to close its reactors and decided to phase the rest out by 2022. Italy held a national referendum, in which 94 percent voted against the government's plan to build new nuclear power plants. In France, President Hollande announced the intention of the government to reduce nuclear usage by one third.

So far, however, the government has only earmarked one power station for closure – the aging plant at Fessenheim on the German border – which prompted some to question the government's commitment to Hollande's promise. Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg is on record as saying that Fessenheim will be the only nuclear power station to close. On a visit to China in December 2014 he reassured his audience that nuclear energy was a 'sector of the future' and would continue to contribute 'at least 50%' of France's electricity output. Another member of Hollande's Socialist Party, the MP Christian Bataille, says the plan to curb nuclear was hatched as a way of securing the backing of his Green coalition partners in parliament. Nuclear power plans were not abandoned in Malaysia, the Philippines, Kuwait, and Bahrain, or radically changed, as in Taiwan. China suspended its nuclear development program briefly, but restarted it shortly afterwards.

The initial plan had been to increase the nuclear contribution from 2 to 4 percent of electricity by 2020, with an escalating program after that. Supplies 17 percent of China’s electricity, 16% of which is. China plans to triple its nuclear energy output to 2020, and triple it again between 2020 and 2030. New nuclear projects were proceeding in some countries. KPMG reports 653 new nuclear facilities planned or proposed for completion by 2030. By 2050, China hopes to have 400–500 gigawatts of nuclear capacity – 100 times more than it has now.

The Conservative Government of the United Kingdom is planning a major nuclear expansion despite widespread public objection. [ ] So is Russia. [ ] India are also pressing ahead with a large nuclear program, as is South Korea. Indian Vice President M Hamid Ansari said in 2012 that 'nuclear energy is the only option' for expanding India's energy supplies, and Prime Minister Modi announced in 2014 that India intended to build 10 more nuclear reactors in a collaboration with Russia.

Investigations [ ] Three investigations into the Fukushima disaster showed the man-made nature of the catastrophe and its roots in associated with a 'network of corruption, collusion, and nepotism.' Regulatory capture refers to the 'situation where regulators charged with promoting the public interest defer to the wishes and advance the agenda of the industry or sector they ostensibly regulate.' Those with a vested interest in specific policy or regulatory outcomes lobby regulators and influence their choices and actions. Regulatory capture explains why some of the risks of operating nuclear power reactors in Japan were systematically downplayed and mismanaged so as to compromise operational safety. Many reports say that the government shares blame with the regulatory agency for not heeding warnings and for not ensuring the independence of the oversight function. The New York Times said that the Japanese nuclear regulatory system sided with and promoted the nuclear industry because of ('descent from heaven') in which senior regulators accepted high paying jobs at companies they once oversaw.

To protect their potential future position in the industry, regulators sought to avoid taking positions that upset or embarrass the companies. TEPCO's position as the largest electrical utility in Japan made it the most desirable position for retiring regulators. Typically the 'most senior officials went to work at TEPCO, while those of lower ranks ended up at smaller utilities.' In August 2011, several top energy officials were fired by the Japanese government; affected positions included the Vice-minister for; the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the head of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. In 2016 three former TEPCO executives, chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and two vice presidents, were indicted for negligence resulting in death and injury. In June 2017 the first hearing took place, in which the three pleaded not guilty to professional negligence resulting in death and injury.

Main article: The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) was the first independent investigation commission by the in the 66-year history of Japan's constitutional government. Fukushima 'cannot be regarded as a natural disaster,' the NAIIC panel's chairman, Tokyo University professor emeritus, wrote in the inquiry report. 'It was a profoundly man-made disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.' 'Governments, regulatory authorities and Tokyo Electric Power [TEPCO] lacked a sense of responsibility to protect people's lives and society,' the Commission said. 'They effectively betrayed the nation's right to be safe from nuclear accidents. The Commission recognized that the affected residents were still struggling and facing grave concerns, including the 'health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment'.

Investigation Committee [ ]. Main article: The purpose of the (ICANPS) was to identify the disaster's causes and propose policies designed to minimize the damage and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.

The 10 member, government-appointed panel included scholars, journalists, lawyers, and engineers. It was supported by public prosecutors and government experts. And released its final, 448-page investigation report on 23 July 2012.

The panel's report faulted an inadequate legal system for nuclear crisis management, a crisis-command disarray caused by the government and TEPCO, and possible excess meddling on the part of the Prime Minister's office in the crisis' early stage. The panel concluded that a culture of complacency about nuclear safety and poor crisis management led to the nuclear disaster. See also [ ].